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Kurzfassung
Fluggesellschaften befinden sich in einem kompetitiven Markt, stark geprägt von andauernden
Preiskämpfen. Gleichzeitig steigt der Kostendruck durch Abgaben wie die Luftverkehrssteuer
und den Emissionshandel. Dadurch bedingt verringert sich die Marge, die Fluggesellschaften
durch den klassischen Transport von Passagieren erwirtschaften können. Dieser Entwick-
lung versuchen die Fluggesellschaften Rechnung zu tragen, indem sie durch das Angebot
zusätzlicher Leistungen (zum Beispiel eines vorzeitigen Sitzplatzreservierung) ihre Marge
erhöhen. Dabei muss man die Kunden besser verstehen, um nachgefragte Produkte zu
akzeptablen Preisen anbieten zu können.
Das Revenue Management ist eine relative junge wissenschaftliche Disziplin, die sich mit der
erlösorientierten Gestaltung von Absatzprozessen beschäftigt. Das Revenue Management hat
seinen Ursprung in der Luftfahrtindustrie und findet in den letzten Jahren zunehmenden
Anklang in weiteren Branchen, wie zum Beispiel der Transport- und Touristikbranche. Eine
der essentiellen Anwendungsvoraussetzungen für das Revenue Management ist ein hetero-
genes Nachfrageverhalten, welches sich abhängig von Zahlungsbereitschaft beziehungsweise
Preiselastizität quantifizieren lässt. Für die Einbettung der zusätzlichen Leistungen in das
bestehende Revenue Management, welches sich bisher nur der Kernleistung (Transport)
widmet, bedarf es daher einer adäquaten Modellierung des Nachfrageverhaltens für Zusat-
zleistungen.
Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Dissertation werden statistische Verfahren vorgestellt und ange-
wandt, die kundensegmentspezifische Präferenzen und Zahlungsbereitschaften für bestimmte
Zusatzleistungen datengetrieben identifizieren. Die kumulative Arbeit beinhaltet zwei anwen-
dungsorientierte Beiträge. Der erste Artikel beschäftigt sich mit einzelnen Zusatzleistungen,
während der zweite Artikel mehrere gebündelte Zusatzleistungen betrachtet. Basierend auf den
unterschiedlichen Datengrundlagen — von der granulären Buchungsebene bis zur aggregierten
Marktebene — werden verschiedene statistische Modelle verwendet. Diese liefern insbesondere
ökonomische Implikationen, zum Beispiel bezüglich potentieller Umsatzveränderung und die
daraus resultierenden strategischen Handlungsempfehlungen für Preisgestaltung und Revenue
Management. Daraus gewonnene Erkenntnisse lassen sich darüberhinaus direkt auf andere
Bereiche des Transports und der Touristik übertragen.

Abstract
In a competitive market, airlines are utterly influenced by ongoing price wars. At the same
time, the cost pressure increases through duties such as aviation tax and emissions trading.
As a result, the margin that airlines can generate through the classic transport of passengers
is reduced. Taking this into account, airlines attempt to increase their profits by offering
ancillary services; for example, advanced seat reservations. In doing so, one has to better
understand the customer, in order to offer demanded products at acceptable prices.
Revenue Management is a relatively young scientific discipline that deals with the revenue-
oriented organisation of sales processes. It has its origins in the airline industry and has
recently become increasingly popular in other businesses, such as the transport and tourism
industry. One of the essential requirements for the application of revenue management is
a heterogeneous demand behaviour, which can be quantified depending on willingness to
pay or price elasticity. For the embedding of the ancillary services in the existing Revenue
Management, which to date has been dedicated only to the core service (transport), an
adequate modelling of the demand behaviour for ancillary services is required.
In this thesis, data-driven statistical methods are introduced and applied to identify the
preferences and willingness to pay for certain additional services on a customer-specific
basis. The cumulative work includes two application-oriented contributions. The first
article deals with one single ancillary service, while the second article considers the bundled
ancillary services. Based on the different databases — from the granular booking level to
the aggregated market level — various statistical models are used. They provide particular
economic implications, for example, regarding the potential change in revenue and the
resulting strategic recommendations for pricing and Revenue Management. Moreover, some of
the findings gained thereof can be directly transferred to other areas of transport and tourism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In the era of big data, the data-driven mindset is reshaping all industries. The aviation
industry has been an excellent paragon on collecting and using data to achieve better
performance since its birth: for fuel efficiency, for plane maintenance and flight safety, as well
as for sales and after-sales. From a statistical perspective, one can find enlightening data
generating processes from pre-flight through in-flight to post-flight period. Indeed, it is not
an exaggeration to say that airlines are not only pushing planes through the clouds but also
terabytes of data.
The research questions in this cumulative thesis were initiated by a cooperation between the
Department of Statistics at Ludwigs-Maximilian-Universität and Lufthansa Group. The scope
of this work is to demonstrate the value of bespoke statistical methods which can make use
for airline Ancillary Pricing and Revenue Management. As the main contributing parts, two
related research articles can be read independently. These publications mainly focus on the
applications of statistical methods that are tailored to provide additional value on accessing and
quantifying the Willingness To Pay or rather Price Elasticity for ancillary services. In order
to connect the various components from both statistical and economic discipline mentioned
above, this chapter gives an elementary introduction to the different scientific fields: Providing
the background of the research and area of the application, Section 1.2 introduces the Revenue
Management as a decision support system in the perspective of an airline. Motivating the
research goals, Section 1.3 reviews the increasing relevance and status quo of ancillary services.
Moreover, Section 1.4 first presents the notation and general setup of basic statistical modelling;
advanced models and inference procedures are demonstrated in further steps with more details.
Last but not least, aspects of the data management are discussed in Section 1.5.
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1.2 Airline Revenue Management
As the core of every airline’s economic model, Revenue Management (RM) has been a success
story of transfer theory to practice since the deregulation of the U.S. airline market in 1978
(Morrison and Winston 1986). The earliest RM model was presented by Littlewood (1972).
Considered as a seminal work in RM, it introduced the idea of maximising the revenue1 instead
of the number of passengers on a particular flight and established the foundations of many
further models. Since then, various other industries adopted RM and contributed to it. The
spectrum does not only include traditional tourism industries such as cruise lines (Ladany and
Arbel 1991), car rentals (Geraghty and Johnson 1997) and hotels (Choi and Mattila 2004) but
also other businesses in the tertiary sector such as entertaining (Huntington 1993), retailing
(Vinod 2005) and advertising (Kimms and Müller-Bungart 2007). Due to many successful
implementations and economical results of RM, even the manufacturing industries from the
secondary sector – which traditionally has its main focus on supply chain management – are
recently groping for research and innovation in the direction of RM (Gruß 2008; Ruhnau 2012).
Whereas supply chain management has its focus primarily on the optimisation of internal
processes and hence the associated costs, RM spotlights the selling of products or services.
“[S]elling the right seats to the right customer at the right prices and the right time”, this
concise description of RM for the airline case in the annual report of American Airlines (1987)
gives us an idea of the exact goals. To achieve these goals, many decisions need to be made.
These decisions can be divided into three categories relating respectively to
• structure: which seats are right?
• price: what is the right price?
• quantity: who is the right customer (if and how many seats available for him)?
According to the laconic phrase of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus: “everything flows”(Beris
and Giacomin 2014), answering these above questions depends on the right time. As illustrated
in Table 1.1, structural decisions in RM are usually made on the strategic level and modified
on the tactical level, i.e., they are aimed at the mid- or rather long-term effect and thus will
not change frequently. In contrast, the timescale of the last two types of decisions depends on
the context and can even vary across firms within an industry. For instance, most traditional
airlines change their pricing structure infrequently and allocate the quantity to sell on an
operative level; budget airlines on the other hand, mainly use price as their tactical variable.
1Low variable costs and high fixed costs in the airline business make maximising revenue approximately
equal to maximising profits.
1.2 Airline Revenue Management 3
 Revenue Management  Marketing and Production Management
Structure decisions Price decisions Quantity decisions
Strategical level
Program:
· Product/Service range
· ...
Market position:
· Luxury, premium or other
· ...
Resourcing:
· Fleet size and aircraft type
· ...
Tactical level
Design:
· Which selling format and channel
· How to bundle
· ...
Price differentiation:
· Segmentability
· How to price over time
· ...
Capacity adjustment:
· Number and location of hubs
· Fleet assignment
· ...
Operative level
Capacity steering:
· Whether to accept or reject a request
· Overbooking
· How to allocate capacity to segments
· ...
Table 1.1: Combination of objects (horizontal) and levels (vertical) of the business decision with
airline-specific examples.
The fundamental difference between quantity-based and price-based RM is that the former
focuses on controlling capacity and not the price. Here, price changes are the consequences of
the changing availability of each booking class, which have differently priced seat capacity. In
contrast, price-based RM adjust the prices dynamically to a pre-set capacity to maximise rev-
enue without booking classes. This antithesis comes from the different historical development
of business models and their corresponding segmentability of the market. Whereas traditional
airlines have a more comprehensive product and service range (hence, also often referred to
as Full-Service Carriers, FSC) and allocate their network’s capacity through product and
price differentiation, budget airlines focus on the price-sensitive customers (hence, also often
referred to as Low-Cost Carriers, LCC) and segment these through self selection along the
booking horizon (Müller-Bungart 2007); Some LCC also use simple models without product
and price differentiation, since their optimal pricing tactic is depending on the competing
FSC and they must offer lower prices than their competitor (Marcus and Anderson 2008).
More details on quantity- and price-based RM can be found in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).
The crucial question of both price-based and quantity-based RM is, however, the same. It is the
decision to accept or reject booking request under uncertain demand and capacity restriction.
To sell or not to sell, that is the question. The RM system as decision support for this question
can be seen as a weighing scale which quantifies the marginal revenue on the demand side
and the opportunity cost on the supply side. If one requesting order will provide more
marginal revenue than the opportunity cost of the requested goods, then it should be accepted.
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As illustrated in Figure 1.1, these two factors are measured and optimised through two separate
apparatuses, namely pricing and capacity steering.
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Figure 1.1: An RM System typically follows four steps: 1. Data collection; 2. Demand modelling; 3.
Offer optimisation and 4. Inventory & Availability control. Quantity-based RM has more focus on
the capacity steering, whereas price-based RM often only uses pricing to steer pre-set capacities.
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The RM process typically involves cycling through four steps at repeated intervals. In the first
step, relevant data will be prepared as input data for the following step of demand modelling.
Diverse parameters of each model will be estimated in the second step and applied in the third
step to find the optimal set of controlling rules until the next re-optimisation. In the last step,
the availability or inventory of products will be controlled using the optimised controlling rules,
which is done either through the airline’s transaction-processing systems or shared distribution
systems. The frequency with which each step is performed depending on many factors such
as the volume of data, the speed that business conditions change, the modelling approach
and the optimisation methods used. The methodological task of statistics in RM is hence the
adequate modelling of demand in order to provide interpretable pricing or steering parameter.
In following, the scientific contributions to RM will be briefly summarised with more focus on
the statistical methods.
Overbooking
Initially, airlines could mainly use overbooking to increase their revenues. Some passengers
will cancel their ticket before departure; this is called cancellation. Some passengers, on
the other hand, do not show up on the day of departure; these are called no-shows. Ticket
cancellations and customer no-shows cause some of the seats to fly empty on the day of
departure, even if the number of seats sold equals the flight capacity. To avoid this spoilage of
capacity, airlines endeavour to utilise their resources efficiently and hence sell more seats than
the flight’s capacity. This excess booking above the capacity of the flight is called overbooking,
and it is the oldest RM practice. The first contribution of statistical methods on overbooking
dates back to Beckmann (1958); Rothstein (1985) discussed following efforts on characterising
cancellation and no-show distributions. Other early developments are listed in McGill and
van Ryzin (1999).
The downside of overbooking is the risk of oversales, where more passengers show up at check-in
as the available seats. In favourable cases where there is still capacity in the next higher cabin,
passengers are happy to be upgraded ; in critical cases, however, they will suffer from so-called
denied boarding which leads to negative customers experience and legal penalties for airlines.
Thus, the benefits of overbooking have to be considered with costs from oversales. Siddappa
et al. (2008) proposed to optimise profit through contrasting the revenue function estimated by
regression splines and the cost function motivated by a binomial distribution of customers’ show
up. The binomial distribution imposes the strong assumption, that cancellation probabilities
are memoryless and depend only on time to departure and not when the ticket was booked.
Iliescu et al. (2008) relax this assumption by using a discrete time model to predict cancellation
and also suggested further statistical methods such as competing risks.
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Arrival process
Motivated by the same reason as for overbooking, i.e., to avoid the spoilage of the seats,
The British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC, now British Airways) started in the
early 70s to offer “early bird” bookings with discounted price (hence often referred to as low
fare) to passengers who booked at least 21 days before departure. This innovation gave the
airline new potential of gaining revenue from seats that would otherwise fly empty. On the
other hand, the risk of spill full fare (also referred to as high fare) late booking customers
occurs. Soon, Littlewood (1972) at BOAC came up with the new twist on the old game
of demand and supply. He suggested to only accept bookings with the discounted fare, as
long as their revenue value (i.e. marginal revenue) exceeded the expected revenue of future
full fare bookings (i.e. opportunity cost). This simple inventory control rule (henceforth,
Littlewood’s rule) marked the beginning of airline RM. After the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, airlines linked certain services and restrictions to respectively booking classes, which
creates product differentiation. The new main task of RM since this point has been the
allocation of inventory/availability and booking classes.
Belobaba (1987) extended Littlewood’s rule to multiple fare classes and introduced Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) for the general approach. Although this heuristic method
does not produce optimal booking limits except in the two-fare case, it became a widely used
practice because it is easy to implement. An overview of extensive research since then on the
allocation problem in quantity-based RM can be found in Chiang et al. (2007). From the
perspective of supply side, development has progressed from optimising single leg, to segment
and finally to origin-destination (Poelt 2016); to reflect the characteristics of the supply side,
the term “network RM ” is often used.
On the demand side, customer arrivals in RM are usually modelled using stochastic processes.
It is assumed that the state is only influenced by the latest event, and the arrival of demand
is regarded as not influenced by inventory/availability controls. Most of the early modelling
approaches assume that customers are passive, in other words: the decision-making process of
the customer was not considered, and they are merely governed by the demand profile specified
at the outset (Shen and Su 2007). Later, a typical convention is to distinguish the myopic
customers who make a one-time purchase decision at their arrival and the strategic customers
who may postpone their purchase to a future time point. Different demand streams are often
correlated; Stefanescu (2009) considered this pattern and proposed a class of multivariate
demand models that capture both the time and the product dimension of demand correla-
tion. Further developments in demand arrival modelling can be found in Cleophas et al. (2009).
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Customer behaviour
Correlation of product demands arises because of heterogeneous customer behaviour. Demand
can be very erratic, and customers’ preferences may differ, e.g., depending on the purpose of
their travel. Hence, it is not a trivial task to match supply and demand. A common simplified
distinction for demand in the airline industry is among between time-sensitive (e.g. business
travellers) and price-sensitive (e.g. leisure travellers) types of customers. When these groups
of customers are offered the same set of products, they will usually make different choices. For
instance, if their preferred product is not available or priced over their Willingness To Pay
(WTP), they may show different substitution behaviour, e.g., switch to different products or
not purchase at all.
The crucial task for airlines to understand customer behaviour and develop different marketing
strategies to accommodate all types of customers is often referred to as “choice-based RM ”,
see Vulcano et al. (2010). Conventional modelling approaches in this area are based on
the framework of discrete choice models, which statistically relate the choice made by each
customer to the attributes of the customer and the attributes of the available alternatives to
the customer, see, e.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2009). These works track
back to the theoretical basis developed by McFadden (1973, 1981, 1984), who was awarded
the Nobel prize for it. The discrete choice models are usually derived under the assumption
of utility-maximising behaviour by the decision-maker (Fishburn 1970), which can also be
used to motivate categorical regression models (Tutz 2012). A detailed review of choice-based
methods in RM can be found in Strauss et al. (2018), and technical details of regression
models will be given in section 1.4.
The development of choice-based RM systems requires price information viewed by customers
at the time of booking. The goal is to forecast demand as a function of price and maximise
revenue by jointly determining what prices to offer in which market, as well as how many seats
to sell at each price. In turn, airlines need to develop methods that take price fluctuations
into account for estimating Price Elasticity (PE), which is the per cent change in demand
caused by a per cent change in price. This measurement of how customers respond to changes
in price can conveniently find its counterpart in the ceteris paribus interpretation of the price
variable in the context of statistical regression models in term of probability. In this thesis,
PE is accessed and quantified in the regression framework. Further methods for calculating
PE2 can be found in Han and Li (2009).
2For interpretation note the distinction between short-term and long-term PE: the immediate response
is radical but the permanent change could be less. Based on the aggregation level of data, the smoothed
short-term effect and the limited long-term interpretation must be considered, see Simon (1989).
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1.3 The motivation of research on Ancillary Pricing
Since the world economic crisis in 2008 reduced profits for many companies, they have carried
out cost reduction policies which have a substantial impact on business travel; simultaneously,
the demand on leisure travel has become more price sensitive, too. For the year 2009, a loss
of 70 billion dollars (ca. 15.8%) on passenger revenue was observed by the International Air
Transport Association (2018a). As a consequence, the fierce competition between low-cost and
traditional carriers has been further intensified, and they are both forced to seek opportunities
to generate additional revenues from other sources beyond the airfare: The former started
to create more additional supplements to upgrade service coverage; the latter unbundle their
products to provide more competitive price. Thus, one can say the most recent industry-wide
development on the strategical level has been to derive revenue from ancillary sources.
According to the global projection of IdeaWorks (2018), the percentage of ancillary revenue
in total revenue has been more than doubled since 2010 (see also Figure 1.2). Indeed, the
worldwide airline revenue in 2017 would be less than in 2015, if no ancillary revenue could
be additionally generated. These figures show the impact that ancillary revenue has on
the bottom lines of airlines. From the perspective of a passenger, ancillary service is also a
critically important element of customer experience.
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Figure 1.2: Global airline revenue development: The percentage an ancillary revenue in total revenue
has been more than doubled since 2019. Data source: IdeaWorks (2018)
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Taking the definition of ancillary in Oxford Dictionaries (2018) “Providing necessary support
to the primary activities or operation of an organisation, system, etc.”, a clear definition of
primary activity/operation is necessary. As the core of the airline business, the primary service
is to transport passengers from origin to destination safely and on time, suiting their schedule.
Along the time horizon, Figure 1.3 illustrates various examples of ancillary services enveloping
this primary core and these can be divided into four categories, where only the unbundled “a
la carte” items are flight-related3 and can thus be easier incorporated into airlines’ existing
RM system. Thus, for this thesis, the focus lies on these flight-related ancillaries. Bearing
mind that other ancillary sources are also relevant as well to maximising revenue for airlines.
pre-flight                                                       in-flight               post-flight 
Safety 
Reliability 
Schedule
Food & Beverage
Priority Boarding
Advanced Seat Reservation
Baggage handling
WiFi & Entertainment
Cancellation fees
No-Show penalty
Airport parking
Travel insurance
Duty-free shopping
On-board magazines
Hotel
Rental cars
Tourist attractions
Lounge access
Airport transfers
Lounge area
Gate area      Primary service

     Unbundled

     “a la carte”

     items

     Advertising

     Frequent Flyer

     Program (FFP)

     Commission

     based third-

     party service
Figure 1.3: Airline primary and ancillary services on the time horizon: While primary service ranges
from short pre-flight to in-flight phase, ancillary services accompany customers in a broader stretch.
The recent practice of unbundling has led to a mixed result. On the one hand, the customers
can purchase the airfare at a competitive price and choose exactly additional services
depending on their preference; this can be seen as a development towards personalisation
of the tailor-made travel experience. On the other hand, passengers who were previously
accustomed to services that were traditionally included within the fare complain that the
airlines take every opportunity to nickel-and-dime their customers.
3In particular, only the data of ancillaries in this category are related to a (booking of a) flight, which can be
managed within the current RM systems. From a pricing perspective, while advertising and commission based
activities are priced on a business-to-business(B2B) level, FFP does also price on business-to-customer(B2C)
level. However, the target of FFP is rather to manage customer relationship than revenue.
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Garrow et al. (2012) reviewed the unbundling trends in the U.S. airline industry and anticipated
that whereas LCCs will more broadly adopt ancillary fees of unbundled items, many traditional
carriers will eliminate their ancillary fees due to negative impacts on customer perception.
Wittmer and Rowley (2014) conducted a survey of economy passengers from a European FSC
and found that they do perceive value in ancillary services and display a general intention
to purchase, especially for services with attribute “hospitality”, e.g., lounge access and seat
selection. Furthermore, the viability of (re)bundling the unbundled items was proven by their
study, because most of the respondents chose such packages in the simulated purchase situation.
Besides the geographical or rather cultural difference of preferences for ancillary service, there is
also a different recommendation for (un)bundling of services depending on airlines’ structure.
In a simplified combinational binary setting of high (e.g. business travellers) and low type
(e.g. leisure travellers) customer, Cui et al. (2018) show that uniform-pricing (respectively,
discriminatory-pricing) firm should unbundle the ancillary service if the fraction of high type
consumers who value the ancillary service is large (respectively, small) enough. Despite the
cultural and structural discussion, this thesis provides statistical modelling approaches for both
unbundled “a la carte” item and ancillary bundle focusing on the pricing insights and possible
application in RM. A short discussion on the research gaps and the goals of this thesis will be
outlined in following subsections.
1.3.1 “A la carte” pricing
As previously described, ancillary services as itself were historically less relevant to overall
profitability or were not offered at all. Airlines are seeking methods to help them understand
how passenger perceive ancillary services. In the economics literature, a la carte item is also
called as an add-on, regardless if new created or unbundled from the previous full-service.
Ellison (2005) showed that add-on pricing could be used as a price discrimination tool for
demand segmentation. Price discrimination stems from the fundamentals of WTP. For a
specific add-on on a flight, the WTP can differ from customer to customer, just as the WTP
for the flight differs between them. To date, the calculation of marginal revenue has been
based on the WTP for airfare only. With no doubt, there are inherent differences between
airfare and ancillaries. One is a necessity, and the other is an option. As such, customers have
different price expectations, sensitivities and motivations and thus different WTP to “must
have” versus “nice to have”. As an illustrative example with an opportunity cost at 90e, the
booking request of a passenger A who is willing to pay 100e for the airfare and nothing for
ancillary services would be accepted in contrast to a passenger B whose WTP for airfare is
80e but for ancillaries is 40e as the add-on.
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In order to improve the existing practice and incorporate the ancillary revenue into pricing
optimisation, airlines first need a reasonable estimate of the revenue potential of ancillary
services. This estimate can then be used to adjust fares to account for both ticket and ancillary
revenue when RM systems calculate availability. As will be described in more details in Chapter
2, most of the studies estimated WTP from Stated Preference (SP) via a questionnaire survey
and not from Revealed Preference (RP) via sales data. SP information from surveys has been
extensively used in literature to elicit WTP for ancillary services, see, e.g., Balcombe et al.
(2009), Correia et al. (2012), and Menezes and Vieira (2008). Despite the progress in survey
design and in results interpretation, it is difficult to avoid the intention-behaviour gap, i.e.,
the difference between “customer attitude” and “customer behaviour”, or in other words the
difference between what consumers claim they are “ready to pay” and what they “actually
pay”. Hence, one crucial task of the research article presented in Chapter 2 is to provide
pricing insights based on RP through sales data and suggest a general modelling approach for
unbundled ancillary items based on statistical methods.
1.3.2 Bundle pricing
Product bundling and unbundling by firms has been a focus of researchers in the industrial
organisation ever since the seminal contribution of Adams and Yellen (1976). The literature
identifies three bundling strategies. Under the pure components (or unbundling) strategy,
the seller offers the products separately; under pure bundling, the seller offers the bundle
alone; under mixed bundling, the seller offers the bundle as well as each single items. As
a strategy, bundling is most suitable for high volume and high margin (i.e. low marginal
cost) products, which makes it a perfect match for the business conditions of airline ancillary
services. Branded Fares were introduced to the airline industry by Air New Zealand in 2004
as a mixed bundling strategy. Since then, numerous airlines have adopted similar schemes
due to the double-edge of creating ancillary revenue sources, as discussed at the beginning
of this section. Besides offering a baseline brand which only including the primary service
transportation, selections of bundled ancillary services are provided as the so-called up-sell
brands. These up-sell brands (usually 2-3 incremental bundles) add a variety of ancillary
services to the baseline brand such as a combination of Advanced Seat Reservation (ASR),
baggage handling, onboard food & beverage or refund and rebook options for a discounted
amount. Because of the discounted amount, bundling can be seen as a value pricing strategy.
However, other strategic advantages of bundling should not be neglected. In particular, for
better brand awareness and passenger segmentation (Fiig et al. 2012; Vinod and Moore 2009),
as well as if certain (new) products require more publicity and need to be promoted.
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To date, the majority in the airline industry is still using bundling primarily as a strategic
tool to promote ancillary items. Hence, they follow a uniform-pricing approach for the up-sell
steps, i.e., the discounted amount. This homogeneous pricing strategy may not justify the
heterogeneous demand on ancillary items included in the bundle. While differential pricing
for up-sell steps can be made based on the length of haul and the corresponding utilities
for the customer, Chapter 3 proposes a statistical modelling approach to understand market-
specific customer behaviour, which does not need to be solely dependent on the length of haul.
Furthermore, the forecast for ancillary revenue can be achieved thereby.
1.3.3 The positioning of the contributing articles
The goal in RM is to maximise revenue: given a flight or a network of flights, allocate
availability to passengers who are willing to pay the most. The decision, whom to prioritise
availability to, depends on the forecast of the expected revenue contribution of different
passengers. Traditionally, the expected revenue is based on posted flight ticket fare which
mirrors the corresponding WTP. With the growing relevance of ancillary revenue, future RM
systems must be capable of considering these ancillary revenues as well. The diverse data
source and differences in price sensitivity create a complex task that today’s RM solutions
have yet to address.
In order to integrate the ancillary revenue into the RM system, airlines need to estimate the
ancillary revenue potential of the passenger. Subject to the level of detail in the available data,
these estimates can vary in granularity. Figure 1.4 illustrates a coordinate system based on
the horizontal dimension of data granularity and vertical dimension of product selling format.
The most extreme level on the data dimension is to estimate ancillary revenue potential by
each individual. If differential pricing based on individual data is also practised to individuals,
it is equivalent to the price differentiation on the first degree in the economic theory (Pigou
1932, Chap. XVII). As it is the case in most businesses4, first-degree price differentiation is an
(uncommon) ideal5 and is difficult to practise in the airline6 industry, too. The data collection
of individual customers is often compromised as the collection of individual booking data,
which can contain more than one individual and hence labelled as semi-individual data in this
thesis. On the other hand, the collection and storage of more granular data also require more
resources. Thus, the estimation based on aggregated booking class or market provides a more
available — especially more economical — alternative level of detail.
4Auctions are the most practised differential pricing methods near to first-degree price differentiation.
5See, e.g., Executive Office of the President of the United States (2015) for further discussion on this topic.
6Although exact individual data are available by some customer (e.g. frequent flyer), they are not the
majority affected by RM systems.
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Figure 1.4: Positioning of the contributing articles: Considering the pricing problem of “a la carte”
ancillary products, Chapter 2 applies statistical models to booking data. On the level of aggregated
data, Chapter 3 provides a model-based market-specific pricing approach for ancillary bundles.
In the current industry practice, prices of single “a la carte” ancillary items are set by pricing
experts in an ad hoc manner. The models presented in Chapter 2 can be used to discover the
additional potential in product pricing on the one hand, and improve the expected revenue
contribution through WTP (either fare or availability) adjustment on the other hand. For
demonstration, Chapter 2 uses ASR as an example, the possible application is however not
restricted to ASR only and can be extended to further flight-related ancillary items.
Given the need to (re)bundle the ancillary services and controversy situation on protecting
data privacy, Chapter 3 takes a step back on the data dimension and engages in the area of
bundle pricing. The estimated market-specific PE provides decision support for making and
evaluating bundle pricing policy.
Economically, both applications in Chapter 2 and 3 can be seen as differential pricing tools on
the second or third degree by providing their managerial implications and strategical recom-
mendation for airlines based on statistical models. To better understand the employed models,
the elementary foundation of statistical modelling is briefly sketched in the following section.
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1.4 Statistical methods
As will be shown in Chapter 2 and 3, the probability of a customer purchasing an ancillary
item or a bundle of ancillaries can be modelled in the regression context. Regression is the
most commonly practised statistical methodology for analysing empirical problems in many
scientific disciplines such as life sciences, social sciences and economics (McCullagh and
Nelder 1989). Since the first regression analysis by Galton (1886), the methodology has been
developed in many ways. In this section, the framework of regression is briefly summarised.
The general setup will be first described and then extended to different model classes. Further
details as well as practical examples can be found in Fahrmeir et al. (2013).
Following conventions of notation are used: random variables are denoted by upper case italic
letters and their observed values by the corresponding lower case italic letters, e.g., the obser-
vations y1, y2, ...yn are regarded as realisations of the random variables Y1, Y2, ..., Yn. Vectors
are written in bold, i.e., y represents a vector of observationsy1...
yn

and Y is a vector of random variables Y1...
Yn
 ,
Note that a matrix is also written in bold upper case letters but not italic, e.g., X. The
superscript (·)T is used for a matrix transpose or when a column vector is written as a
row, e.g., y = (y1, ..., yn)
T . Greek letters denote parameters, and the symbol ˆ is used for
estimators, e.g., the parameter vector β is estimated by β̂ .
Both the probability density function of a continuous random variable and the probability
mass function for a discrete random variable are referred to their distributions and denoted
by fθ(y), where θ represents the parameters of the distribution. The formulation P̂(Y |X) is
used for the predicted outcome probability, in particular with the focus on conditioning on
the model input X and not the probability distribution itself nor its (estimated) parameter.
The expected value and the variance of a random variable Y are denoted by E(Y ) and V(Y )
respectively.
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1.4.1 Regression models
In the setting of classical linear regression, it is assumed that the true expectation E(Y ) = µ of
the response or dependent variable Y = (Y1, ..., Yn)
T ∈ Rn with realisations y = (y1, ..., yn)T is
linked to a linear combination of k explanatory or independent variables (or simply covariates)
and unknown parameter β = (β1, ..., βk)
T . This is given by
µ = η = Xβ, Y ∼ Nn(µ, σ2In), (1.1)
where the design matrix X = (x1, ...,xk) contains k columns of covariates and n rows of
observation. The linear predictor η results directly from the linear combination Xβ . In is an
n-dimensional identity matrix and σ2 > 0 is the variance of the independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) errors, stemming from observing an erroneous version
y = Xβ + e, e ∼ Nn(0, σ2In). (1.2)
It is assumed that the errors are uncorrelated amongst each other.
The usual estimation procedure for the parameters β follows by minimising the squared errors
β̂OLS = arg min
β
(y −Xβ)T (y −Xβ) (1.3)
and β̂OLS hence called the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator.
This setting provides a simple way to describe the relationship between explanatory variables
and a response variable. Together with the straightforward computation to obtaining
parameter estimates due to a closed-form solution β̂OLS = (X
TX)−1XTy, as well as the
intuitive interpretation of the results, make the classical linear regression model an attractive
and frequently used approach in the empirical analysis.
As the famous aphorism of the British statistician Box and Draper (1987) states, “all mod-
els are wrong, but some are useful”, and models are more useful if they are tailored to the
characteristics of the nature of the investigating object. The adequate formulation and inter-
pretation of regression models require therefore explicit consideration of the different types of
the response variables as well as the explanatory variables. Following this principle, questions
from various scientific disciplines led to the need to extend the classical linear regression model,
mainly for the following two types of more general situations:
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Type I: The response variable follows a distribution different from a normal distribution, for
instance, the response variable can be binary or categorical.
Type II: The relationship between the response and explanatory variables is not linear.
Generalised Linear Model
Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) demonstrated the unity of many extended statistical methods
which overcome the limitation of OLS for both above-described situations. They created the
necessary concept with the introduction of Generalised Linear Models (GLM). The GLM is
characterised by two assumptions:
The distributional assumption constitutes that, given covariates xi, i = 1, ..., n, the response
Y1, ..., Yn are conditionally independent and the conditional distribution of these responses
belongs to a distribution family with densities of the form
fφ,θ(yi) = exp
[
yiθ − a(θ)
φ
+ c(yi, φ)
]
, (1.4)
which presents the exponential family when with a fixed dispersion parameter φ scaling the
variance. Note this scale parameter φ does not depend on the observation i = 1, ..., n.
Table 1.2 lists some well-known distributions in the exponential family. In this context, θ is
the natural or canonical parameter, and both a(·) and c(·) are functions corresponding to the
type of the distribution. The exponential family has many desirable properties that make it
useful for statistical analysis. One particular is the direct access to a sufficient statistics for
the parameter of interest (Barankin and Maitra 1963). For a collection of n i.i.d. random
variables sampled from the same exponential family distribution, the joint likelihood7 of θ can
be obtained by taking the product
Ly(θ)
i.i.d.
=
n∏
i=1
fθ(yi) =
[
n∏
i=1
c(yi)
]
exp
[〈
θ,
n∑
i=1
yi
〉
− n · a(θ)
]
(1.5)
with sufficient statistic t(y) =
∑n
i=1 yi summarising the data. Note that an exponential family
distribution can have a multidimensional parameter, i.e., θ ∈ Rd, d ≥ 1.
7Here, the roles of the data y and the parameter θ are interchanged. The likelihood is considered as a
function of θ for fixed data y, in contrast to the distribution as a function of y for fixed θ. However, both are
the same function of y and θ jointly.
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Normal N (µ, σ2) Bernoulli B(1, π) Binomial B(n, π) Multinomial M(n,π)
fθ(y) =
1√
2πσ
exp
[
− 12σ2 (y − µ)
2
]
πy(1− π)(1−y)
(
n
ny
)
πny(1− π)(n−ny) n!y1!···ym! exp(
∑M
m=1 ym log πm)
yi ∈ R {0, 1} {0, 1} {1, ...,M}
µ = µ π π (π1, ..., πM )
T
θ(µ) = µ log
(
π
1−π
)
log
(
π
1−π
) [
log
(
π1
πM
)
, ..., log
(πM−1
πM
)
, 0
]T
a(θ) = θ
2
2 log(1 + e
θ) n log(1 + eθ) n log(
∑M
m e
θm)
Table 1.2: Selection of well-known distributions belonging to the exponential family, for extensions
see Wood (2006, p. 61), Tutz (2012, p. 61) and Fahrmeir et al. (2013, p. 303).
The structural assumption determines the linear predictor ηi = x
T
i β as in classical linear
regression to the conditional expectation E(Yi|xi) = µi with a more general transformation
µi = h(ηi)⇐⇒ ηi = h−1(µi) = g(µi) = xTi β. (1.6)
The response function h(·) is required to be bijective and two times continuously differentiable.
The inverse h−1(·) = g(·) is called link function. Note that the natural parameter θi is also a
function of the expectation µi, i.e., θi = θ(µi). Furthermore, the mean is of the form
µi = a
′(θi) =
∂a(θi)
∂θi
(1.7)
and the variance V(Yi|xi) = φν(µi) results from the second derivative ν(µi) = a′′(θi) = ∂
2a(θi)
∂θ2i
.
If the natural parameter directly corresponds to the linear predictor, the link function is called
natural or canonical link function and is given by g(µi) = θ(µi) = ηi.
As shown in Table 1.2, both binary yi ∈ {0, 1} and categorial yi ∈ {1, ...,M} outcomes can
be modelled by GLM-type regression models. The binomial distribution is the sum of i.i.d
distributed Bernoulli random variables and the multinomial distribution is a generalisation of
the binomial distribution for multiple outcomes. A generic form of the (multinomial) logit
model is given by
µr = P(Yi = r|xi) = logit−1(ηi) =
exp(xTi β r)∑M
m=1 exp(x
T
i βm)
, (1.8)
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where additional side constraints have to be specified ensuring the parameters β to be
identifiable, e.g.,
∑M
m=1βm = (0, ..., 0).
The parameter estimation in GLM is usually based on the Maximum Likelihood (ML) principle
β̂ML = arg max
β
L(β) =
n∏
i=1
fθ(yi), (1.9)
where the likelihood L(β) is given as the product of exponential family distributions due to
stochastic independence of response variables Y1, ..., Yn. Following equation (1.7) and (1.6),
the canonical parameter θ in the exponential family distribution fθ(yi) is determined by µi =
h(xTi β) and hence ultimately by β . Maximising the likelihood is equivalent to maximising the
log-likelihood
l(β) =
n∑
i=1
log
[
fθ(yi)
]
(1.10)
due to the monotonicity of the log function. This estimating procedure is typically achieved
through iterative numerical methods such as Newton-Raphson or Fisher-Scoring, since an
explicit analytical solution in closed-form can only be found for some special cases. More
details and examples can be found in Knight (2000, Sect. 5.7).
Generalised Additive Model
Another extension of the class of regression models is the Generalised Additive Models (GAM)
proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986). The idea is to combine the aspects of parametric
and non-parametric regression models, i.e., some covariates are modelled in the predictor by
linear combinations and others by the sum of J unknown functions additionally:
η = η lin + ηadd, with η lin = Xβ and ηadd =
J∑
j=1
fj(z j). (1.11)
These additive terms are particularly attractive to overcome the problems raised in general
situations of type II as described at the beginning of this subsection; for instance, to capture
the seasonality which plays a relevant role in the airline industry.
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For a given continuous covariate z = (z1, ..., zn)
T , a smooth effect f is assumed and represented
by suitable basis function expansions, e.g.,
f(z) =
K∑
k=1
γkBk(z) (1.12)
for a univariate and
f(z1, z2) =
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
γk,lBk(z1)Bl(z2) (1.13)
for a bivariate smooth representing a tensor product, where the (marginal) basis dimensions
are given by K and L respectively. For the sake of easier illustration, the following examples
are in the univariate case. The basis functions B(·) are evaluated at the observed values z ,
resulting an n × K-dimensional matrix B = [Bk(zi)]i=1,...,n;k=1,...,K . The corresponding basis
coefficient vector γ = (γ1, ..., γK)
T can be estimated together with the parametric coefficients
in θ = (β,γ)T by using a composed design matrix (X,B1, ...,BJ). The resulting model is
linear in the parameters and can be estimated within the GLM class via Newton-Raphson-type
algorithm.
For the choice of suitable basis functions, Wood (2006, Sect. 4.1) provide a broad overview of
different options. Among others, B-splines introduced by Schoenberg (1946a,b) is a commonly
used basis representation. For sufficiently high basis dimension, resulting splines are continuous
and differentiable functions, which can be evaluated efficiently and provide mathematically as
well as numerically desirable properties (Boor 1972, 2001). The arbitrary choice of basis
dimensions K however, can lead to over-fitting if K is too large and flexibility loss if K is
not large enough. Eilers and Marx (1996) proposed a penalised version of B-Splines (hence
P-Splines) by estimating coefficients for a generous number of B-Spline basis functions with a
quadratic penalty based on a penalised log-likelihood
lp(θ) = l(θ)−
1
2
K∑
k=1
λγTPγ, (1.14)
where P represents a K ×K-dimensional penalty matrix and the smoothing parameter8
λ tuning the influence of the penalty and thus the smoothness of the resulting estimated
function f̂ = Bγ̂ . In particular for P = IK , f̂ → 0 when λ→∞ and f̂ unpenalised when λ = 0.
8Using this to penalise non-parametric terms is hence called semi-parametric approach.
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In contrast to the log-likelihood in the case of GLM, there are two kinds of the parameter to be
optimised in the case of GAM: the regression coefficient vector γ and the smoothing parameter
λ. For fixed λ, the estimation of γ can be performed using Penalised Iteratively Re-weighted
Least Squares (P-IRLS), see Wood (2006, Sect. 3.4) for details. For finding optimal λ, different
approaches are discussed in Wood (2006, Sect. 4.5). Among other common practices such
as the (Generalised) Cross-Validation (GCV) or the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),
restricting the likelihood by decoupling the smoothing parameter λ (as variance parameter) and
the regression coefficients serves as another alternative. Technically, the variance parameter
is thereby fitted by the (scaled) average of the likelihood over all possible values of regression
coefficients. This approach can also be derived from the Mixed Model (MM) perspective,
which will be briefly introduced in following. Ruppert et al. (2003) provides fuller coverage on
the connection between GAM and MM.
Mixed Model
Both GLM and GAM can be extended to Generalised Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) and
Generalised Additive Mixed Models (GAMM) with random effects b, which, in contrast to
the fixed coefficients β , are assumed to be random variables following a normal distribution
N (0,R) with covariance matrix R. The (parametric) predictor results to
η = Xβ + Ub, (1.15)
and the marginal likelihood of θ for all observations can be written as
L(θ) =
w∏
i=1
∫ ni∏
j=1
f(yi,j|bi, θ)f(bi|R)dbi, (1.16)
where the random effects bi are shared by the (repeated) measurements yi,j within a cluster
i = 1, ..., w. This structure can be motivated by the heterogeneity of the clustered responses.
The clusters can be, e.g., different customer groups or diverse products. Specifying the
covariance matrix R account for correlations among measurements. Moreover, only the
variance parameter of the random effects need to be estimated, in comparison to estimating
models with fixed effects for each cluster.
For maximising equation (1.16), the model presented in Chapter 2 employs the Laplace approx-
imation (Breslow and Clayton 1993) as a special case in approximating the integral (Pinheiro
and Chao 2006). Approximating the data with quasi-likelihood (Wolfinger and O’Connell
1993) would be another option, which however does not allow inferential statements.
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1.4.2 Summary statistics
The main task in network RM is to find the revenue-optimal allocation of (future) booking
request on the total flight network. Hence, the dimension of the data used in the RM system
can be massive for airlines with a large network. In practice, analysing massive data is
often challenging due to either memory, storage or computation limitation. Confronting
such limitations, numerous researchers have been contributed to the application of statistical
models based on distributed data, see Caragea et al. (2004), Chu et al. (2013), Lee et al.
(2017). The techniques of data management in this area have been developed from dividing
the entire dataset into vertical fragments (reducing covariates/coefficients dimension k) or
horizontal fragments (reducing observations dimension n).
Taking the classical linear regression as in equation 1.2 for an illustrative example, directly
computing the “all data” estimate β̂OLS = (X
TX)−1XTy from all observations may not be
feasible for large scale data, because the design matrix X with dimension n × k cannot be
constructed within memory as a whole. In order to solve this problem, the large scale data
can be partitioned into subsets s ∈ S, and the corresponding design matrices Xs with smaller
dimensions ns × k are created.
One strategy is to estimate each of these horizontal fragments and obtain β̂ s = (X
T
sXs)
−1XTs ys,
then weight the estimates to obtain
∑
sWsβ̂ s/
∑
sWs with weighting matrix Ws = X
T
sXs.
The use of this weighting matrix rewards data fragments with lower variability and vice versa.
Note that the estimation procedure must be performed |S| times.
A tempting alternative is to compress each data fragment into summary statistics ts,1 = X
T
sXs
and ts,2 = X
T
s ys, with respective dimensions k × k and k × 1. Combining the compressed
summary statistics via
∑
s t
−1
s,1
∑
s ts,2 = (
∑
sX
T
sXs)
−1∑
sX
T
s ys = β̂ is precisely equivalent
to the “all data” estimate due to the matrix properties and the estimating procedure only
requires to be run for only one time. For extended regression models such as GL(M)M
and GA(M)M, this convenient equivalence does not generally hold due to their non-linear
transformation and estimating equations. As a remedy, Xi et al. (2009) and Lin and Xi
(2011) proposed to linearise the likelihood with Taylor’s expansion and if the derivatives
only depend on sufficient statistics ts and β̂ s, the aggregated estimate approaches the “all
data” estimate asymptotically. Note this estimating strategy with summary statistics avoids
accessing raw data from each of the fragments to a central location. In some applications,
this is an additional advantageous property to preserve data privacy. Further aspects of data
privacy will be discussed in the next section.
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1.5 Data management
The intense competition among airlines limits the amount of data shared within the industry
as well as to academia. Combined with inherent difficulties in linking purchase and pricing
data, most academic publications are either based on SP information as described in Section
1.3 or simulations studies, e.g., Bockelie and Belobaba (2017). Taking sales data as RP
information, certain technicalities of data management need to be clarified.
First of all, the collection and linkage of different data sources require a standardised procedure.
Airlines usually treat ancillary services with the same business rules as flight tickets (TKT)
on a supporting Electronic Miscellaneous Documents (EMD) and require association between
the flight tickets and EMD. For each specific ancillary service (e.g. ASR), further data sets
which contain detailed features, e.g., seat row and column, need to be acquired. Note that most
airlines only maintain TKT and EMD data but not specific ancillary data in the past (Ratliff
and Gallego 2013). The linkage between these data sets can be achieved through Passenger
Name Record (PNR), which is also commonly known as Booking Reference to the customer.
Table 1.3 illustrates the structure of the matched data.
Data set: PNR ... TKT ... EMD ... ASR
Variable:
Booking
reference
...
Number of
passengers
...
Flight
number
Orig. &
Dest.
...
Ticket
price
...
Ancillary
item
...
Ancillary
price
... Seat
ABC123 ... 1 ... 811 A-B ... 666 ... NA ... NA ... NA
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
XYZ789 ... 2 ... 111 A-C ... 999 ... ASR ... 30 ... 1A
XYZ789 ... 2 ... 111 A-C ... 999 ... ASR ... 30 ... 1B
Table 1.3: Structure of the matched booking data: PNR is the most practised matching variable.
PNR was originally used to compare flight passenger data (e.g. identity and flight destination)
against information held by security and border agencies. Note the information contained in
PNR are not only for the ordinary course of airline business (i.e. enabling reservations and
carrying out the check-in process) but also they can be sensitive personal information helping
to fight terrorism and other crimes (The European Parliament and of the Council 2016a).
Facing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR9), data set contains PNR as an
identifier arise a data privacy concern. De-identifying data by removing sensitive identifiers
(e.g. PNR) and apply disclosure control methods can not completely remove the risk of privacy
breach (Fienberg 2006; Hundepool et al. 2012). For future research with reproducible air-
line data, more privacy conscious matching procedures need to be standardised by the industry.
9See more details in The European Parliament and of the Council (2016b) and Tikkinen-Piri et al. (2018)
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From the data technical side, the program ONE Order from the International Air Transport
Association (2018b) visions a data communication standard to support secured and simplified
data management by the year 2021. It aims to supersede the current booking and ticketing
records including EMD and PNR as well as to combine the content of those records into a
single retail and customer oriented order. On the one hand, the data quality can be improved
by avoiding mismatch and redundant or overlapping records. On the other hand, more data
privacy protection can be achieved.
For the current and future data usage, although the pricing schemes in RM systems do
not base on personal data directly and are anonymous10 information, the practice of
differential pricing would generally fall under the scope of GDPR, despite the degrees of
price differentiation (Steppe 2017). Facing this and further challenges, it is suggested to
the airline industry to either apply models based booking data in a distributed manner
using summary statistics as discussed in Section 1.4.2 or consider the modelling approaches
based on aggregated data, e.g., as in Chapter 3. Both approaches make innovative changes
in the demand modelling step and the corresponding data collection step in the RM
system (recall Figure 1.1) and steer clear of the accessing of raw data which arise privacy con-
cern and still allow to access and quantify the WTP and PE of (and beyond) ancillary services.
Last but not least, for the completeness of use-case information, it is important to mention that
Chapter 2 analyses intercontinental flights due to higher relevance of ASR, whereas Chapter
3 examined continental markets, because branded fares were not available in intercontinental
markets yet at the time of the research. Thus, the generalisation of interpreted results must
consider this limitation, despite the modelling approach is universally applicable to the data
in the respective markets.
10These data are not related to an identified person and are anonymous from a statistical perspective, but
not necessarily from a data protection perspective.
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Shuai Shao, Göran Kauermann, Michael Stanley Smith
Submitted to
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
on
10. Sep. 2018
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Abstract
Motivated by the growing importance of ancillary revenues in the airline industry,
we propose a statistical model for the behavior of airline passengers making Ad-
vanced Seat Reservations (ASR). We focus on the questions of whether, when and
which seats are selected. To address these questions, we employ a discrete time
duration model, combined with a discrete choice model. Both employ unknown
smooth covariate effects, that are estimated using contemporary P-spline method-
ology. This is applied to a large database of bookings on five intercontinental routes.
By incorporating random effect terms to account for seat-specific heterogeneity, we
find strong evidence of “middle seat avoiding” and “front seat preferring” effects.
We also show that the willingness to pay for ASR depends on its price in relation
to the ticket price, as well as on the distribution channel. These and other insights
allow for product differentiation and variable pricing in ASR for each and every
seat. In addition, the statistical model can also be used for other ancillary products
— such as on-board dining and preferential baggage checking — allowing dynamic
pricing of ancillary products in general.
Keywords: Advanced Seat Reservation; Airline Ancillary Pricing; Customer Be-
haviour Analyis, Discrete Choice Model; Discrete Time Duration Model; Willingness
To Pay
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1 Introduction
In the age of internet-based search engines, airlines are confronted with increased price
transparency. For traditional airlines this has led to increased competition with low cost
carriers. Together with numerous other market changes, such as the global economic slow
down and new travel policies (mainly cost cutting) of companies, airlines have responded
by offering new ancillary services to increase revenues. Advanced Seat Reservation (ASR)
— the ability to select specific seats prior to check-in — is one of these services. The aim
of our study is explore the extent to which passengers are willing to pay for ASR using a
new and large booking dataset.
To our knowledge, Lee and Luengo-Prado [2004] made the first contribution in this
area by asking if passengers are willing to pay more for additional legroom by comparing
two different settings of increased seat pitch. They found that the Willingness To Pay
(WTP) is higher if seat pitches are increased for some rows which can only be reserved
by passengers who pay a full fare. This suggests that price discrimination is possible only
if there is heterogeneity in the product value. Until recently, there has been very limited
variability in airline seat selection, with only two products: legroom and standard seats.
We show in this paper that there is substantial heterogeneity in customer preference for
ASR at the individual seat level, which results in high variability in passengers’ WTP for
reserving each and every seat.
A number of studies have found heterogeneity in seat preference in other industries.
For example, for train travel Wardman and Murphy [2015] show that seats and their
configuration are fundamental part of the journey experience. They investigated how
seating preferences depend on factors such as travel distance and journey purpose. Taking
also the price component into account, Leslie [2004] studied profit implications of price
1
36 2. “A la carte” pricing with semi-individual booking data
discrimination for a Broadway play based on seat quality in theatres. Veeraraghavan
and Vaidyanathan [2012] also measured seat value perceived by consumers at baseball
stadiums.
However, before the recent introduction of ASR as an ancillary service in the airline
industry, airline seats within the same booking class had the same price, and seat location
in the plane was not considered. In direct contrast, it has long been the case that prices of
seats in stadiums or theatres are valued higher when they offer a better view of the event.
With different seat values based on seat location, the price of a selected seat (or more
generally an ancillary product) can indicate how much a passenger values a particular
seat. Espino et al. [2008] used an experiment in which Spanish travellers stated their
preferences in six service attributes, including additional legroom for a short haul flight
of two virtual airlines. Depending on the model specification, these authors found that
the WTP for additional legroom varied between 15e and 34e. In contrast, Garrow et al.
[2012] found that passengers of Delta Air Lines were unwilling to pay for extra legroom
on short flights, but were willing to purchase ASR on international markets. Balcombe
et al. [2009] applied a Bayesian model in a related survey and found a comparable WTP
for seats with more legroom. Studies from other scientific disciplines have also focused on
legroom, e.g. from the ergonomic aspect (see Kremser et al. [2012] and Vink et al. [2012]).
ASR does not only apply to seats with extra legroom, and customer preferences in
choosing between standard seats is also of interest. For instance Daft and Albers [2012]
took both standard and legroom-seats into their profitability calculation for long haul
flights of low-cost carriers. Caussade and Hess [2009] extracted WTP for some service
attributes including standard and preferential (similar to legroom) seats from stated pref-
erence data in a branded fare context. Mumbower et al. [2015] contributed to the literature
on ancillary fees by providing the first insights into the role of load factors and seat-map
2
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displays of all ASR-seats on customers’ purchasing behavior of seats with extra legroom
using revealed preference data.
In this paper, we contribute to this research by considering the probability of making
an ASR, as well as the preference for selecting between different seats. By focusing on
standard ASR, and not legroom ASR, we want to answer three questions: whether and
when passengers make use of standard ASR, and if so, which seats are preferred?
To shed light on these questions we consider a statistical modelling approach with
multiple components. The probability that passengers make a seat reservation is mod-
elled in the first part as a discrete time-to-event model, see e.g. Tutz and Schmid [2016].
We include non-parametric smooth terms in the model to accommodate the influence of
continuous covariates, such as time of year to capture seasonality and time to departure.
We make use of penalized spline estimation following the original ideas of Eilers and Marx
[1996] and the further developments of Ruppert et al. [2003] and Wood [2017]. The sec-
ond part of modelling focuses on seat selection, conditional on an ASR being made. For
this, we employ a multinomial choice model (see e.g. Train [2009] and Fahrmeir and Tutz
[2001]). Here, a random effect for seat number is included to account for seat heterogene-
ity. All models fall within the framework of generalized additive mixed models originally
proposed in Hastie and Tibshirani [1990] and extensively extended; see Wood [2017] for
a recent exposition.
A rich set of flight, booking and seat-specific factors are found to determine customer
preference for ASR. As for flight-specific factors, departure day of year is a strong seasonal
component. Moreover, bookings that include multiple passengers are more likely to reserve
seats in advance. Compared to bookings made via intermediaries, passengers who book
directly by airlines are more likely to reserve seats in advance. Seat-specific factors reveal
that passengers prefer front rows and avoid middle seats. Another key result is that the
3
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price sensitivity for seat reservation depends on ticket price and decays towards departure.
Last, we show that the revenue implications of adopting dynamic pricing for ASR based
on our statistical model are substantial in dollar terms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
data using in the study. We outline the statistical model in Section 3, and provide an
overview of the estimation method employed in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the
empirical results, and run a comparison of the predicted and realised revenues as model
validation in Section 6. We focus on the implications for ancillary revenue generation in
Section 7 before concluding in Section 8.
2 Data
We analyse five intercontinental routes of a major European airline which wishes to remain
anonymous, so that throughout this paper we refer to it as “AirABC”. The data were
collected from destinations A, B and C in South-America, D in Asia and E in North-
America. All these routes were served by flights originating from the same European city
by the same aircraft type (Boeing 747-8) with an identical seat-map, which is depicted in
Figure 1.
The data were collected from economy class passengers who departed between Febru-
ary 2015 and December 2016. The data can be divided into two time periods. The first
period is between February 2015 and January 2016, where ASR was offered at a constant
price. From February 2016 to December 2016, the prices for ASR were experimentally
varied in route A and B in an attempt to access and quantify price elasticity. Such ex-
periments are rare in the airline industry and experimental pricing on a grand scale is
difficult and in our case conflicted with transparent pricing communication for customers.
4
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Lufthansa Boeing 747-8 (8 First/80 Business/32 Premium Economy/244 Economy)
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Figure 1: Seat-map of the analysing economy cabin of Boeing 747-8 by AirABC.
We therefore use the log relative price for ASR as the price variable, that is defined as
p = log

Price of ticket + Price of ASR
Price of ticket

.
Treating the ticket price, and hence p, as an exogenous variable is problematic when
estimating price elasticity using demand data. This can lead to biased estimates, see e.g.
Davidson and Mackinnon [1993] Davidson and Mackinnon [1999], Wooldridge [2012] or
Petrin and Train [2010]. In this paper, however, we condition on bookings, because ASR
can only be carried out once a ticket is booked. This implies that the ticket price is fixed
and the endogenous relationship between booking process and price is accounted for. We
therefore can treat ticket price — and also p — as exogenous when modelling ASR.
The observational unit in our study is the booking of an itinerary. A single itinerary
booking can include multiple passengers, as well as multiple flight segments. Therefore,
the entire trip of a booking may include more than the considered intercontinental flight
(i.e. route A, B, C, D or E), such as a connecting flight before or after the intercontinental
flight. However, in this study we only consider the outbound flights for the five routes
(i.e. without inbound flights if there are any in this booking), so that no dependencies
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between the flights within one booking are considered. If we did not, we would have to
account for the dependence between the inbound and outbound legs of a return flight.
We are aware of the fact that this is a major simplification of ASR. But for the purpose
of presentation and model validation as well as interpretation, it is helpful to simplify the
task.
In total we have 485, 279 observations of bookings: 254, 849 from the data in Period I
(February 2015 to January 2016) and 230, 430 from the data in Period II (February 2016
to December 2016). The data for routes A and B, where the prices for ASR were varied in
an experimental setup, will allow us to check the validity of using the log relative price as
our price variable, by computing the out-of-sample prediction error for the experimental
data in Period II. In Table 1 we give the detailed numbers of booking for the different
routes in each and both data periods.
Route: A B C D E Total
Data
Period:
I 49,687 48,017 54,624 41,628 60,893 254,849
II 42,883 44,838 52,138 36,707 53,864 230,430
I & II 92,570 92,855 106,762 78,335 114,757 485,279
Table 1: Number of bookings in each data period (rows) and route (columns).
2.1 Covariate Variables
We include a number of covariates in our analysis in order to identify the driving factors
behind ASR. These covariates can be divided into three categories; namely flight-specific,
booking-specific and seat-specific quantities. To begin with the first, let f be the index
6
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for a particular flight and xflightf be the flight-specific covariates. In our study these are
xflightf = {departure day of year, departure day of week}
= {df ,WDAYf}.
Note that d ∈ {1, ... , 366} and WDAY has Monday as a reference category. Note that
our data covers 2016, which was a leap year with 366 days. Throughout this paper, we
label categorical variables (such as departure day of week) with capitalized abbreviations,
and other variables with single lower case letters. The specific levels of our categorical
variables are written in italics.
Let i = 1, ... , nf be the index of the bookings for a particular flight f and xbookingf,i be
booking-specific covariates for bookings i = 1, ... , nf . We include:
xbookingf,i = {days to departure when booking ticket, days to departure when selecting seat,
log relative price for ASR, multiple passenger booking, distribution channel}
= {tf,i, sf,i, pf,i,MULTIf,i,CHNLf,i}.
Days to departure is a negative ordinal variable ranging from −365 to 0, where 0 is the
day of departure. A seat can only be reserved if a booking has already been made, so
that tf,i ≤ sf,i, where tf,i = sf,i occurs if the booking and ASR have been carried out
at the same time. Depending on the route and airline, seat reservations are free for all
passengers via online check-in at some time point close to departure. In our data the
online check-in process starts two days before departure, after which seat selection is free
of charge. Thus, we do not include observations where the ticket is booked at tf,i > −2.
Furthermore, we consider all seats selected during the online check-in process as not ASR
7
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by definition. In this case we set sf,i = 0, indicating a booking without ASR. We give
more details subsequently. The covariate MULTI is a dummy variable for whether, or
not, there were multiple passengers in the booking. The covariate CHNL indicates the
distribution channel of the booking. There are four channels here: Direct, which means
the ticket was booked by AirABC directly1; Chains, which means the ticket was booked
through traditional travel chains; OTA, which means the ticket was booked by an Online
Travel Agency (OTA); and Others, which includes all other options. A summary of all
covariates except departure day of year2 is given in Table 2. Note that the total count by
variables for ASR differs from the total count by variables for bookings.
Finally, seat-specific covariates are denoted by xseatl , where subscript l indexes the
possible seats for ASR, with l = 1, ..., L. We include the following seat-specific covariates:
xseatl = {window, middle or aisle seat, plane section of seat, special seat}
= {WMAl, SECTl, SPECl}.
In our case there are L = 144 seats being offered for ASR on every flight. The number
of reservations recorded for each of these seats in our data are depicted in Figure 2. We
take the Middle seats as the reference category of covariate WMA. We also separate the
cabin into three sections, with reference category Front for rows 28 − 33, and categories
Middle and Back for rows 39− 44 and 45− 49, respectively. The seats B, C, H, and J in
rows 45− 47 are special seats because there are only two adjacent seats and they are not
in a row of three seats; see also Figure 1. We will discuss the effects of these and other
covariates in detail in Section 5.3.
1This includes bookings via call-center, city-office, official homepage or mobile application.
2A summary of this covariate would not be informative, since all routes were served on a daily basis.
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Numerical variables (booking-specific): Min. 1stQu. Median Mean 3rdQu. Max.
Time point of booking (t) -365.0 -81.0 -36.0 -58.7 -15.0 -2.0
Time point of ASR (s 6= 0) -362.0 -60.0 -25.0 -46.8 -10.0 -2.0
Log relative price (p in %) 0.0 1.3 2.3 2.1 3.1 5.7
Categorical variables for bookings (flight-specific): Count Prop.
Departure day of week (WDAY)
Monday 70150 14.5%
Tuesday 66365 13.7%
Wednesday 64204 13.2%
Thursday 65901 13.6%
Friday 69591 14.3%
Saturday 75007 15.4%
Sunday 74061 15.3%
Categorical variables for bookings (booking-specific):
Multiple passengers (MULTI)
No 369248 76.1%
Yes 116031 23.9%
Distribution channel (CHNL)
Direct 112712 23.2%
Chains 142073 29.3%
OTA 60988 12.6%
Others 169506 34.9%
Categorical variables for ASRs (seat-specific):
Window, middle or aisle seat (WMA)
Window 36376 27.3%
Middle 24452 18.4%
Aisle 72155 54.3%
Plane section (SECT)
Front 76029 57.2%
Middle 26017 27.1%
Back 20937 15.7%
Special seat (SPEC)
No 115587 86.9%
Yes 17139 13.1%
Table 2: Summary of covariates across all five routes. The upper rows present summaries
of the numerical covariates, which are all positively skewed. The lower rows present the
summaries for the categorical covariates. Bookings are dominated by single passengers.
9
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Figure 2: Total frequency of selected seats of all ASRs in our data. While in Figure 1
there are 198 seats, some are blocked out of the ASR-booking system because they are
reserved for customers with special loyalty status or who need mobility assistance.
2.2 Response Variables
The first response variable is whether ASR has been made or not, which we denote as
yf,i(s) =



1, if ASR is made at the time point s
0, otherwise,
where s ∈ {tf,i, ...,−2}. In our statistical model, we further distinguish bookings where
s = tf,i, i.e. an ASR and booking have been made together at the same time point (about
12% of all bookings) or tf,i < sf,i ≤ −2, i.e. an ASR was made after booking the ticket
(about 8% of all bookings).
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3 Model
As discussed in the introduction, we focus on the questions of: whether and when an ASR
is made, and if so, which seat(s) are selected. To this end, we decompose the model into
two parts. The first models the if and when an ASR is made, while the second accounts
for seat selection.
3.1 Timing of ASR
We consider yf,i(s) as a stochastic process taken as a discrete time duration model. This
accounts for the probability of making an ASR, given that an ASR has not been made
before. As we have stated previously, the majority of ASRs are made at the time of
booking, and we model these separately. This leads to a two component model for the
probabilities:
ASR Model 1 (ASR with booking): P[yf,i(tf,i) = 1] and (1)
ASR Model 2 (ASR after booking): P[yf,i(s) = 1|yf,i(t) = 0 for tf,i ≤ t < s; s ≤ −2],
(2)
where for simplicity, we omitted the covariates in the above notation. The ASR Model 1
is modelled using a logit model:
P[yf,i(tf,i) = 1] = logit−1(ηA1 ), where
ηA1 = β1,0 + η
flight
1 (xflightf ) + η
booking
1 (xbookingf,i ). (3)
We use superscript A to refer to this aspect of the ASR model and the first subscript 1
represents being the first part of this model. As covariates we include flight- and booking-
11
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specific quantities. The first block of covariates enter the model in a semi-parametric
manner through
ηflight1 (xflightf ) = WDAYf · βflight1,1 +mflight1 (df ), (4)
where mflight1 is a smooth periodic function capturing seasonal variation. The dot between
WDAYf and the coefficients βflight1,1 denotes the usual expansion of a categorical variable
(omitting the reference category). In the second block, booking-specific covariates are
included through
ηbooking1 (xbookingf,i ) = 1{MULTIf,i=1} · βbooking1,1 + CHNLf,i · βbooking1,2 +
pf,i · βbooking1,3 +mbooking1 (tf,i), (5)
where mbooking1 is a smooth unknown function.
Of particular interest is to quantify how the log relative price pf,i influences the prob-
ability to reserve a seat, for which we expect a negative coefficient βbooking1,3 . On the other
hand, the effect of multiple passenger is expected to be positive, because we assume the
passengers who travel together want to sit together, which can only be ensured through
making an ASR.
The ASR Model 2 applies if customers do not reserve a seat at the time point of
booking the ticket. They may do so at a later occasion. We model this by employing
a discrete time-to-event model. To be specific, we again make use of a conditional logit
model and set for s ≤ −2:
P[yf,i(s) = 1|yf,i(t) = 0 for tf,i ≤ t < s; s ≤ −2] = logit−1[ηA2 (s)], where
ηA2 (s) = β2,0 + η
flight
2 (xflightf ) + η
booking
2
[
xbookingf,i (s)
]
. (6)
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Again, superscript A refers to the ASR model and the first subscript 2 represents being
the second part of this model. As with equation (4), the flight-specific effect ηflight2 is
ηflight2 (xflightf ) = WDAYf · βflight2,1 +mflight2 (df ). (7)
The booking-specific effect ηbooking2 has a similar form to equation (5), but with the time
point of booking tf,i replaced by the time point of seat reservation sf,i, so that
ηbooking2
[
xbookingf,i (s)
]
=1{MULTIf,i=1} · βbooking2,1 + CHNLf,i · βbooking2,2 +
pf,i · βbooking2,3 +mbooking2 (sf,i). (8)
Note that the log relative price pf,i is a time varying variable for routes A and B, where the
price for ASR has been varied. The smooth function mbooking2 captures how the intensity
for ASR booking changes with the days to departure, and can therefore be seen as a
baseline intensity of an inhomogeneous process.
3.2 Seat Selection
If the passenger decides to reserve a seat, he or she needs to select one or more seats. This
selection is modelled by a discrete choice model, where the choice set changes over time,
because seats that have been reserved before are not any longer available. We make use of
a multinomial logistic model with a varying consideration set. We can describe the seats
with seat-specific covariates. But even if we do this, we observe from Figure 2 that some
seats are preferred, although they are in principle similar to other seats. This indicates
that we should not treat seats as homogeneous, but allow for seat-specific heterogeneity.
Let Cf (t) be the consideration set of available seats on flight f at time point t, where t
13
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denotes the time to departure. We define with Sf,i the set of seats reserved on flight f
by passengers with booking i. Note that Sf,i = ∅ if no ASR has been made (the most
common case) and we do not model seat selection for these bookings. The set Sf,i contains
a single element if a single seat has been reserved and multiple elements if multiple seats
have been reserved at the same time. Note also that Sf,i ⊆ Cf (s̃f,i), i.e. seats can only
be reserved from available seats, where s̃f,i refers to the time point just prior to the seat
reservation for booking i on flight f . We model the selection of seats for which ASR is
made as:
P(Sf,i) =
∏
l∈Sf,i
exp(ηSl )∑
r∈Cf (s̃f,i) exp(ηSr )
, where
ηSl = ηseat0 (xseatl ) + ηseatl (x
booking
f,i ), (9)
and superscript S denotes the label Seat Selection Model. The linear components ηSl
decompose to effects which depend on seat-specific covariates, i.e.
ηseat0 (xseatl ) = xseatl · βseat0 (10)
and two seat random effects
ηseatl (x
booking
f,i ) = b0l + 1{MULTIf,i=1}b1l, (11)
that capture seat-specific heterogeneity. The random effect b0l is the seat preference,
while the random effect b1l captures seat preferences that occur when seats are reserved
for couples or groups; i.e. for multiple passengers.
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4 Estimation
The Log-likelihood of all model components together can now be written as
∑
f
∑
i
{
yf,i(s = tf,i) · ηA1 − log
[
1 + exp
(
ηA1
)]
+ (ASR Model 1)
1{yf,i(s=tf,i)=0}
min(sf,i,−2)∑
s=tf,i+1
{
yf,i(s) · ηA2 (s)− log
{
1 + exp
[
ηA2 (s)
]}}
+ (ASR Model 2)
1{Sf,i 6=∅}
∑
l∈Sf,i
{
ηSl − log
[ ∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i)
exp
(
ηSr
)]}
}
, (Seat Selection Model)
(12)
where the linear predictors are given above. The maximizer of the separate likelihoods
equals the joint likelihood because of the separability of parameters in different com-
ponents. ASR Models 1 and 2 are both generalized additive models with both mixed
effects and semi-parametric smoothing components, which can be estimated using maxi-
mum likelihood. We use the mgcv package [Wood, 2011] for fitting in R [R Core Team,
2016]. The Seat Selection Model is a discrete choice model with varying choice set and
we outlined how to estimate it below. Note that
P(Sf,i) =
∏
l∈Sf,i
exp(xlβ0 + b0l)∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i) exp(xrβ0 + b0r)
. (13)
The Log-likelihood for this component can be written as
l(θ) =
∑
f
∑
i
∑
l∈Sf,i
{
Z f,i,lθ − log
[ ∑
r∈Cf (s̃f,i)
exp(Zf,i,rθ)
]}
, (14)
where Z f,i,l = (xl,ul,1{MULTIf,i=1}ul), ul is the indicator vector having entry 1 at the l-th
position and 0 otherwise and θ = (βT0 , bT )T refers to the parameter of this component,
where b = (b01, b02, ..., b0L, b11, b12, ..., b1L). We consider vector b as random and impose a
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prior distribution on b, that is


b01
b02
...
b0L


∼ N(0, σ20IL) and


b11
b12
...
b1L


∼ N(0, σ21IL). (15)
This leads to the marginal likelihood of a generalized mixed model:
l(β0,σ2) = log
∫
exp
[
l(θ)− 12θ
TDθ
]
·
∣∣∣σ20IL
∣∣∣
− 12 ·
∣∣∣σ21IL
∣∣∣
− 12 db. (16)
where D is of block structure D = blockdiag(0, 1
σ20
IL,
1
σ21
IL) and σ2 = (σ20, σ21). We rewrite
the exp(·) component to a penalized likelihood
lp(θ,σ2) = l(θ)−
1
2θ
TDθ. (17)
Following and extending Breslow and Clayton [1993] we integrate out b and obtain with
Laplace approximation the approximate likelihood
l(β0,σ2) ≈ −
L
2 σ0 −
L
2 σ1 −
1
2 log
∣∣∣∣
∂2lp(θ̃, σ2)
∂b∂bT
∣∣∣∣+ lp(θ̃), (18)
where θ̃ = (β0, b̃) and b̃ denote the solution to
∂lp(θ,σ2)
∂b
= 0. (19)
We thereby assume that the determinant in equation (18) depends only weakly on θ, see
Breslow and Clayton [1993]. Note that b̃ implicitly depend on β0 and σ2. With θ̂(σ2) we
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define the final estimate of
∂lp(θ̂, σ2)
∂θ
= 0, (20)
so that θ̂ = (β̂0, b̂). Following Kauermann et al. [2009] we can estimate σ20 and σ21 using
the approximation
σ̂20 ≈
b̂
T
0 b̂0
df0
, (21)
with
df0 = tr





(
∂2lp(θ̂, σ2)
∂θ∂θT
)−1(
∂2lp(θ̂, σ2 =∞)
∂θ∂θT
)

0


, (22)
where the index 0 extract the columns belonging to b0, see also Schulze Waltrup and
Kauermann [2017]. Note that (21) is not an analytic estimating equation since both sides
depend on σ20. An analogous formula holds for b1 and the estimation of σ21. The maximiser
θ̂ of equation (17) can be seen as a parameter estimate β̂0 as well as a posterior prediction
for the random coefficients b̂. More details are given in the Appendix A.1.
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5 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the models for each of the five routes separately. For conciseness, we report
the results in detail for route A, and compare revenue implications for the five routes in
Section 7.
5.1 Factors Affecting ASR when Booking
The parameter estimates for the ASR Model 1 fitted to the bookings on route A during
data Period I, are given in Table 3. We see for departure day of week (WDAY), there are
significant positive coefficients for Friday, Saturday and Sunday, relative to the reference
category Monday. The effects of different distribution channels (CHNL) show that the
chance of making an ASR decreases when the ticket is not booked directly by the air-
line; especially when it was booked by an OTA. This is because many online agents do
not show ASR as an option for ancillary service to the customer. Moreover, customers
buying tickets from tour operators (which belongs to the category Others) often get an
all-inclusive offer, which may not have ASR as an option. Besides the common cost-based
argument described in Granados et al. [2012], this insight is another reason why airlines
increasingly require a distribution cost charge for bookings made through global distri-
bution systems, but not directly through airlines themselves. Furthermore, we observe
a significant positive effect of multiple passengers (MULTI). This shows that customers
who travel together (often couples and family members) are more likely to make an ASR
to ensure sitting together. The effect of log relative price (p) can now be interpreted as
the WTP, with an increase of 1% log relative price decreasing the chance of making an
ASR by almost a half (e−60.302×0.01 = 0.547). Except for WDAY, all estimated parametric
effects are similar for the five routes A-E, as shown in Table 7 of Appendix A.2.
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Parameter Est. SE
Intercept ***-0.413 0.057
Departure day of week (WDAY, Ref.: Monday)
Tuesday 0.023 0.061
Wednesday 0.072 0.062
Thursday -0.041 0.062
Friday ***0.221 0.057
Saturtay ***0.335 0.056
Sunday ***0.233 0.056
Multiple passengers (MULTI) ***0.220 0.037
Distribution channel (CHNL, Ref.: Direct)
Chains ***-0.817 0.041
OTA ***-2.738 0.095
Others ***-1.472 0.039
Log relative price (p) ***-60.302 1.700
Table 3: Coefficient estimates for ASR Model 1 fitted to the bookings on route A during
data Period I. The reference categories are also reported for the categorical variables.
Standard errors are also reported, and parameters that are significantly different from
zero at the 1% level are denoted with three stars.
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Figure 3: Estimated smooth effects for route A in ASR Model 1. The left panel gives the
departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure m2(t)
effect. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the dashed
lines are 95% confidence bands.
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The estimated smooth semi-parametric effects for route A are plotted in Figure 3.
There is a strong seasonal component (departure day of year) for the propensity to make
an ASR at the same time as a ticket booking. This is mirrored for all other routes except
route C; see Figure 8 - 11 of Appendix A.3. For the days to departure (t) we observe a
oscillating effect with a strong propensity to make an ASR (joint with booking) between
50 and 10 days prior to departure. The same result is found for the other four routes in
our study.
5.2 Factors Affecting ASR after Booking
The parameter estimates for the ASR Model 2 fitted to the bookings on route A during
data Period I are given in Table 4. The intercept is much smaller than that found in Table
3, which indicates that the chance of making an ASR is much smaller if customers did
not make an ASR with their flight booking. In comparison to ASRs made at the time of
booking, the effect of MULTI remains similar, but the effects of CHNL are weaker. This
means that distribution channels play a less (negative) role here compared to the reference
category Direct. This is because AirABC can reach out to customers after the tickets are
booked and before the flight departs; e.g. via email advertisement. The baseline intensity
of booking time s of an ASR made after booking is illustrated on the right hand side of
Figure 4. It shows that most ASRs are made in the month prior to departure. On the
other hand, the seasonal effect is weaker than that for the ASR Model 1. The estimated
effects — both categorical and smooth nonlinear — are similar for the other four routes,
except for WDAY (see Table 8 and Figures 12 - 15 in Appendix A.2 and A.3).
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Parameter Est. SE
Intercept ***-6.433 0.055
Departure day of week (WDAY, Ref.: Monday)
Tuesday 0.002 0.055
Wednesday -0.048 0.056
Thursday -0.029 0.055
Friday ***0.266 0.052
Saturday ***0.293 0.052
Sunday ***0.180 0.054
Multiple passengers (MULTI) ***0.265 0.030
Distribution channel (CHNL, Ref.: Direct)
Chains ***0.686 0.049
OTA ***-0.205 0.060
Others ***0.505 0.045
Log relative price (p) ***-38.092 1.717
Table 4: Coefficient estimates for ASR Model 2 fitted to the bookings on route A during
data Period I. The reference categories are also reported for the categorical variables.
Standard errors are also reported, and parameters that are significantly different from
zero at the 1% level are denoted with three stars.
Departure Day of Year (d) Days to Departure (s)
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Figure 4: Estimated smooth effects for route A in ASR Model 2. The left panel gives the
departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure m2(s)
effect. The second can also be considered as the baseline purchasing intensity for this
model. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the dashed
lines are 95% confidence bands.
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5.3 Factors Affecting Seat Selection
The parameter estimates for the Seat Selection Model are given in Table 5 and three
observations can be made. First, the significant positive effects of Aisle and Window
account for the preference of these seats compared to the reference category Middle. We
name this behaviour as “middle seat avoiding”. Secondly, the seats in the Middle section
of the plane have significantly smaller probability of being reserved, than those in the
Front of the plane. Moreover, this probability gets even smaller for the seats in the Back
of the plane. This phenomenon can be described as “front seat preferring” and it is quite
strong for intercontinental flights, presumably because passengers want to exit the plane
quicker after landing at their destination. Last, the significant positive effects of special
pair seats (SPEC) in the back of the plane can be explained by the generous extra space
on the fuselage side of the seats, as illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed in some frequent
flyer forums, e.g. Miller [2012] and Chan [2013].
Parameter Est. SE
Window, middle or aisle seat (WMA, Ref.: Middle)
Aisle ***1.812 0.042
Window ***1.614 0.045
Plane section (SECT, Ref.: Front)
Middle ***-0.862 0.033
Back ***-2.133 0.085
Special seat (SPEC) ***1.908 0.088
Table 5: Coefficient estimates for the Seat Selection Model fitted to the bookings on
route A during data Period I. The reference categories are also reported for the categorical
variables. Standard errors are also reported, and parameters that are significantly different
from zero at the 1% level are denoted with three stars.
Figure 5 gives the heat-map of the estimated seat random effects for ASRs made by
single passengers b1l, and multiple passengers b0l. The latter shows that the “middle
seat avoiding” effect is neutralised with multiple passenger bookings. Adding all effects
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Figure 5: Heat-map of estimated random intercepts b0l (upper panel) and b1l (lower panel)
in the Seat Selection Model for route A.
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Figure 6: The overall heat-maps from the Seat Selection Model for route A. The upper
panel gives the map for ASRs made by single passengers and the lower panel gives the
map for ASRs made by multiple passengers.
23
58 2. “A la carte” pricing with semi-individual booking data
(ηseat0 , b0l and b1l) together provides an overall heat-map for the popularity of seats in
the aircraft. Figure 6 shows this for route A, and for a comparison with the routes in
both data periods see Tables 9 - 10 and Figures 16 - 19 in Appendix A.2 and A.3. As a
possible application to forecasting, one can weight the heat-maps of single and multiple
passengers depending on the expected mixture of future arrival demand in order to get a
generic heat-map of attractiveness of all the seats in the aircraft.
6 Model Validation
To validate the above model we investigate the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of fitted
ASR Models 1 and 2. We fit the models to the data in Period I and then predict the
expected revenue from ASR for the bookings in Period II by multiplying the predicted
probability of an ASR for each booking by the price pASR. Note that both the point
forecasts and prediction intervals can be computed. Our models break expected revenue
into two parts: that arising from customers who made an ASR at the time of booking
(ASR Model 1), and the revenue from customers who made an ASR afterwards (ASR
Model 2). An expression for overall expected revenues is therefore:
R̂EV =
∑
f
∑
i
[
P̂1f,i · pASRf,i + (1− P̂1f,i) ·
−2∑
s=tf,i+1
P̂2f,i · pASRf,i (s)
]
, (23)
where P̂1f,i and P̂2f,i are the predicted probabilities from equation (1) and (2), respectively,
and the summation is over all flights and bookings in the out-of-sample period. Note,
for the expected revenues in ASR Model 2, we have to condition on the complementary
probability 1 − P̂1f,i, and sum over the purchasing probabilities up to two days before
departure; i.e. exactly the last day before the check-in process begins and ASR becomes
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free.
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Figure 7: 95% prediction intervals of expected ASR revenue (vertical solid lines), and
realised (horizontal dashed lines) ASR revenue for bookings in Period II.
Figure 7 plots the resulting predicted values of revenue for each of the five routes
and the corresponding prediction variability based on the model. The realised revenues
are drawn as dashed lines in each route. Furthermore, there are three kinds of expected
revenue computations based on three different price variables, which are used to modify
our model for fitting and predicting. The first uses log relative price p = log
(
pTKT+pASR
pTKT
)
as the price variable. This is the variant introduced in this paper. The second uses the
ticket price pTKT as the price variable, while the third includes no price variable at all.
For the latter case, the predictive interval of expected revenue does not cover the realised
revenue for any of the five routes. Because the price of ASR pASR did not vary in Period
II for routes C, D and E, the predictions using the nominal and relative ticket prices
are the same. However, on routes A and B, the use of the log relative price instead of
the nominal price greatly improves the accuracy of the revenue prediction. These results
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suggest that it is useful to use the logarithm of the price of ancillary services, relative
to the ticket price, to estimate the WTP. This has the substantial advantage that it is
not necessary to run pricing experiments for ancillary products to obtain variation in the
nominal price. In particular, airlines can price the ancillary products dynamically relative
to the paid ticket price by combining our ASR Models 1 and 2.
7 Economic Insights and Managerial Implications
It has been more than three decades since American Airlines [1987] described revenue
management as the discipline “to maximize passenger revenue by selling the right seats to
the right customers at the right time”. The original definition has been extended to include
at least two more important factors: with the right price and in a right combination
by Cross [1997]. The key of this discipline is understanding customers’ perception of
product value, so that price can be varied in order to maximise revenue. Before ASR
was introduced, airlines were not selling the specific seat(s), but one or other seat(s). It
has become popular — including at AirABC — to sell legroom and standard ASR as an
ancillary product. In this section we will discuss the benefits of extending this to allow
for variable pricing based on the above models that use flight, booking and seat-specific
covariates, compared to a single pricing policy for standard seats.
Route: A B C D E
ASR Model 1: -60.302 -50.668 -72.656 -54.140 -83.431
ASR Model 2: -38.092 -30.151 -30.105 -41.962 -45.313
Table 6: Estimated effect of log relative price in all five routes in data Period I, which
can be interpreted as price elasticities.
We first look further at the price elasticities for ASR using the log relative price p.
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The negative coefficients of log relative price in ASR Models 1 and 2 can be interpreted
as transformed relative price elasticities, and are summarized in Table 6, where the first
column gives the effects already reported for route A in Tables 3 and 4 above. These
values can be used for predicting the demand for ASR. Before doing so, we stress an
interesting insight: the price elasticity is weaker in ASR Model 2 than in ASR Model 1.
That is, if an ASR is made after booking the ticket, passengers are less price sensitive.
This appears to be a behavioral effect, with the price paid for the ticket having a declining
effect over time on the subsequent decision of whether to make an ASR. Moreover, the
price of a flight ticket can be considered as a reference price, as defined by Fibich et al.
[2005], where its effect decreases with time.
A second insight is that the booking channel plays an important role. In particular,
tickets that are not sold directly by AirABC, rarely are combined with an ASR at the time
of booking. This suggests that management should endeavour to seek ways to increase
ASR for tickets booked via these channels. The program, “New Distribution Capability”,
recently launched by IATA is directed to meeting this objective (see Hoyles [2015]).
Finally, the third insight is that customers find that seats are heterogeneous. This is
partially due to variations in seat-specific features, and partially due to heterogeneity in
customer preferences. These are substantial as demonstrated by the heat-map in Figure 6.
In this figure, the overall seat effects are depicted on the logarithmic scale. For example,
ASR for seat 28A is approximately 20 times more attractive to single passengers than seat
43E (e2−(−1) = 20.09). The strategic implication for pricing and revenue management is
to give different prices to all seats for ASR according to their estimated value.
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8 Discussion
Understanding customers’ needs means that airlines can offer them the right product.
Therefore, product differentiation has become one of the key success factors in many
industries. The results of our analysis suggest that the ASR for standard seats — which
are currently sold at the same price — are valued differently by customers. By adopting
the characteristics of the seat heat-map, airlines have many possibilities to differentiate
these products. For example, they could bundle bookings for multiple passengers with
ASR, especially for those customers who seek to sit together in the special seats in rows
45 − 47 in this cabin configuration. Another example is to give different prices to aisle
or window seats, as well as for different plane sections. One result of doing so, is that
booking data can be collected where the price per standard seat varies. Such data can
be used to estimate our proposed ASR Model using the nominal ticket price, rather than
the relative price. This will enable us to compute nominal WTP for each seat.
In practice, airlines have pursued two forms of price discrimination. The first involves
adopting different prices for the same product through the use of booking classes and
fare rules that cater to different customer segments in the market. The second is product
differentiation through offering different products to different customers. For the new
rising star of ancillary services, adopting nuanced price discrimination can make it a ma-
jor driver of profitability. While we consider ASR in detail here, our work provides a
framework for modelling customer preferences for other ancillary products using flight,
booking and seat (or potentially other product) specific information. Particularly rea-
sonable is the use of log relative prices, rather than nominal prices. This is because it
exploits the variation in the already dynamically-varied ticket price to allow for estima-
tion of the (relative) WTP or price elasticity, without requiring experimental pricing of
28
63
ancillary products. One interesting area for future research is to explore optimal pricing
of bundles of ancillary services. For this type of analysis, we suggest focusing on the data
generating process as we have done in this paper, but also considering the relationships
between products in a bundle.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivations and algorithm for estimation
To maximize the penalized likelihood lp(θ,σ2), two derivations are requested.
Score Function:
s(θ) = ∂l(θ)
∂θ
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
l∈Sf,i
{
ZTf,i,l −
1∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i) exp(Zf,i,rθ)
·
∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i)
[exp(Zf,i,rθ) ·ZTf,i,r]
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
l∈Sf,i
{
ZTf,i,l −
∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i)
exp(Zf,i,rθ)∑
q∈Cf,i(s̃f,i) exp(Zf,i,qθ)
·ZTf,i,r
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
l∈Sf,i
{
ZTf,i,l −
∑
r∈Cf,i(s̃f,i)
πr ·ZTf,i,r
}
(24)
where πr = exp(Zf,i,rθ)∑
q∈Cf,i(s̃f,i)
exp(Zf,i,qθ)
and with penalization: s(θ,λ) = s(θ)−Dθ where λ = ( 1
σ20
, 1
σ21
).
Fisher Information:
F (θ) = − ∂
2l(θ)
∂θ∂θT
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
r
{∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ) · exp(Zf,i,rθ)ZTf,i,r ·Zf,i,r − exp(Zf,i,rθ)ZTf,i,r ·
∑
q[exp(Zf,i,qθ) ·Zf,i,q]∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ) ·
∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ)
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
r
{exp(Zf,i,rθ)ZTf,i,rZf,i,r∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ)
−
exp(Zf,i,rθ)ZTf,i,r ·
∑
q[exp(Zf,i,qθ)Zf,i,q]∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ) ·
∑
q exp(Zf,i,qθ)
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
r
{
πrZ
T
f,i,rZf,i,r − πrZTf,i,r ·
∑
q
exp(Zf,i,qθ)∑
j exp(Zf,i,jθ)
·Zf,i,q
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
r
{
πrZ
T
f,i,rZf,i,r − πrZTf,i,r ·
∑
q
πq ·Zf,i,q
}
=
∑
f
∑
i
∑
r
{
πrZ
T
f,i,r(Zf,i,r −
∑
q
πqZf,i,q)
}
. (25)
With Penalization: F (θ,λ) = F (θ) +D
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We use Newton-Raphson-Algorithm
θ(k+1) = θ(k) +F−1(θ(k),λ(k)) s(θ(k),λ(k)) (26)
to estimate the parameters and for the asymptotic variance of estimation we use the sandwich estimator
ŝe(θ) =
√
diag[F−1(θ,λ) F (θ) F−1(θ,λ)], (27)
where
θ̂ − θ
ŝe(θ)
∼ t(n− p′, 0). (28)
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A.3 Additional Figures
Departure Day of Year (d) Days to Departure (t)
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Figure 8: Estimated smooth effects for route B in ASR Model 1. The left panel gives the
departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure m2(t)
effect. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the dashed
lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 9: Estimated smooth effects for route C in ASR Model 1. The left panel gives the
departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure m2(t)
effect. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the dashed
lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Departure Day of Year (d) Days to Departure (t)
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Figure 10: Estimated smooth effects for route D in ASR Model 1. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(t) effect. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 11: Estimated smooth effects for route E in ASR Model 1. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(t) effect. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Departure Day of Year (d) Days to Departure (s)
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Figure 12: Estimated smooth effects for route B in ASR Model 2. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(s) effect. The second can also be considered as the baseline purchasing intensity for
this model. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 13: Estimated smooth effects for route C in ASR Model 2. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(s) effect. The second can also be considered as the baseline purchasing intensity for
this model. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Departure Day of Year (d) Days to Departure (s)
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Figure 14: Estimated smooth effects for route D in ASR Model 2. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(s) effect. The second can also be considered as the baseline purchasing intensity for
this model. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 15: Estimated smooth effects for route E in ASR Model 2. The left panel gives
the departure day of year m2(d) effect, and the right panel gives the days to departure
m2(s) effect. The second can also be considered as the baseline purchasing intensity for
this model. The point estimates of the functions are given by the solid line, while the
dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 16: The overall heat-maps from the Seat Selection Model for single passengers in
each route during data Period I.
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Figure 17: The overall heat-maps from the Seat Selection Model for single passengers in
each route during data Period II.
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Figure 18: The overall heat-maps from the Seat Selection Model for multiple passengers
in each route during data Period I.
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Figure 19: The overall heat-maps from the Seat Selection Model for multiple passengers
in each route during data Period II.
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Chapter 3
Bundle pricing with aggregated market
data
Chapter 3 presents a applied research article, which concerns the bundle pricing problem.
Considering the nature of customers’ choices between purchasing no ancillaries, single ancillary
items (“a la carte”) or multiple ancillaries in a bundle; a discrete choice model based on
multinomial distribution is proposed.
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Shao, S., Kauermann, G. (2019) Understanding price elasticity for airline ancil-
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Kauermann critically revised and contributed to the manuscript by giving valuable inputs on
modelling and interpretation approaches, as well as proofreading.
82 3. Bundle pricing with aggregated market data
83
84 3. Bundle pricing with aggregated market data
85
86 3. Bundle pricing with aggregated market data
87
88 3. Bundle pricing with aggregated market data
89
90 3. Bundle pricing with aggregated market data
Chapter 4
Final remarks
The success of airlines has always been accompanied by new challenges and opportunities,
as well as new methods and new disciplines. Given the new freedoms to set prices after the
deregulation of markets in the late 70s, airlines rapidly embraced the concepts of differential
pricing, in which different prices are offered not only for different physical products (e.g. First,
Business and Economy cabins), but also identical services within the same cabin. Differential
pricing involves both methods, product differentiation and price discrimination. Based on
these methods, RM has since then developed various innovations on network optimisation as
well as choice modelling, and established itself as a capacious discipline.
Since the beginning of this century, existing RM systems are facing new challenges. As
a major recent development in the airline industry, ancillary revenue opportunities bring
challenges in parallel with the big data revolution. This thesis encompassed different statistical
methods applied to airline RM. It is demonstrated that regression models can be modified as
tailor-made solutions for accessing WTP and quantifying PE. In the case of ASR, it is shown
how a single ancillary item can be embedded in current RM systems with differential pricing
based on semi-individual booking data. Furthermore, models based on aggregated market
data are proposed to evaluate revenue-oriented ancillary bundle pricing policy. In this spirit,
models applied in this thesis can also be utilised in other industries (e.g. hotels, car rentals,
cruise companies) with the need for incorporating ancillary revenue to their RM systems. As
the contributions in each chapter already contain specific remarks and research perspectives,
global remarks on applying statistical methods to the transportation and tourism industry in
connection to big data are given in following.
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Originally1, big data are defined by its big volume, velocity and variety (Laney 2001). Modern
transportation and tourism as information-intensive industries are predestined to be affected
by big data seeing that
• volume: the extensive network of destinations leads to large databases;
• velocity: booking data are often available on a real-time basis;
• variety: a rich set of ancillary services provides different types of information.
As King (2016) notes, “big data is not about the data”, but much more about extracting
valuable information from them. To achieve this goal, multiple scientific disciplines are
in demand, or even competitive in a certain way. For instance take the generative and
algorithmic culture defined by Breiman (2001): The former is more concerned with the data
generating process from the statistical point of view; the latter has more focus on predictive
capability and is more present in computer science.
While the majority of academical research in statistics is dedicated to further methodological
development in a very advanced and sophisticated way, it is also essential to make use of
the opportunities in interdisciplinary applications. In the action plan proposed by Cleveland
(2001), it is even suggested to give interdisciplinary investigations the most resources. At
long last, the benefits of the developed statistical methods cannot be demonstrated without
application.
Finally, the author would like to emphasise the cited aphorism from Box and Draper (1987)
again: since “all models are wrong, but some are useful”, both generative and algorithmic
culture can be useful for real-world problems in the big data era, depending on the research
question, goal and complexity. Indeed, the emerging scientific discipline data science can
also make valuable contributions to RM, since it combines but not replaces both cultures
(Kauermann and Seidl 2018). For the collaboration with RM, statistical methods can be
more useful by offering not only models but also the theoretical foundation behind, which
can find their equivalence in the quantitative branches of economics; or more importantly,
their equivalence in the standard steering parameter in RM systems (recalling the success
story of RM stems from transferring theory to practice). With no doubt, developments in
interpretable machine learning from the algorithmic culture can be useful in this way as well,
see more details in Molnar (2019). In this spirit, this thesis can also be seen as an appealing
research invitation to applying interpretable machine learning to RM.
1The original definition of big data with 3 Vs has been since then extended in many versions, e.g., additionally
with veracity, value, validity, variability and volatility. Here, the respective justification is disclaimed. Instead,
the focus lies on demonstrating how the transportation and tourism industry is affiliated with big data.
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